Equilibrium Selection in Auctions and High Stakes Games
提出测试集均衡精炼纳什均衡，并应用于三个经典拍卖博弈，同时引入高赌注博弈理论，证明当修订成本较小时测试集均衡会从中涌现。
We introduce the test†set equilibrium refinement of Nash equilibrium to formalize the idea that players contemplate only deviations from equilibrium play in which a single competitor plays a non†equilibrium best response. We then apply this refinement to three well†known auction games, comparing our findings to similar ones previously obtained by specialized equilibrium selections. We also introduce a theory of high stakes versions of games, in which strategies are first proposed and then subjected to a potentially costly review†and†revise process. We demonstrate a sense in which the test†set equilibria emerge from such processes when the cost of revision is small.