THE EFFECTS OF MUTUAL FUNDS ON M&A COMPENSATION
研究共同基金如何通过投票反对管理层提案，降低CEO在并购中的超额薪酬并提高薪酬绩效敏感性，尤其对业绩差和基金持股多的公司影响更大。
Abstract Motivated by shareholders’ interest in combating executive wealth expropriation through the merger and acqusition (M&A) process, we study how mutual funds influence firm behavior around an acquisition through votes against management proposals. We find that mutual funds reduce the chief executive officer's ability to extract rents during the M&A process by voting against management‐sponsored compensation proposals after the acquisition, thus lowering both excess compensation and increasing pay‐for‐performance sensitivity. Furthermore, mutual fund voting magnifies the impact on negatively performing firms and firms with a larger amount of the mutual fund's holdings in the firm.