Director Connectedness: Monitoring Efficacy and Career Prospects
研究发现独立且非被任命的审计委员会成员的关联性会提升财务报告质量和会计稳健性，市场对高关联董事死亡反应更负面，且高关联董事职业前景更好。
We examine a specific channel through which director connectedness may improve monitoring: financial reporting quality. We find that the connectedness of independent, non-co-opted audit committee members has a positive effect on financial reporting quality and accounting conservatism. The effect is not significant for non-audit committee or co-opted audit committee members. Our results are robust to tests designed to mitigate self-selection. Consistent with connected directors being valuable, the market reacts more negatively to the deaths of highly connected directors than to the deaths of less connected directors. Better connected directors also have better career prospects, suggesting they have greater incentives to monitor.