Does the size of local government debt affect the level of debt of off-budget entities? The case of local government in Korea
研究了2008-2013年韩国16个城市和省份的数据，发现地方政府债务增加会导致公共企业债务上升，表明地方政府利用预算外实体隐藏债务、缓解预算压力。
The rapid growth of debt of off-budget entities is the result of budgetary constraints. When local governments face fiscal stress, with rising debt, they tend to rely on local public enterprise debt to minimize debt limits and budgetary constraints. This study tests how the debt level of local governments affects the debt level of off-budget entities in 16 Korean metropolitan cities and provinces from 2008 to 2013, applying panel regressions. The results assert that as the debt of a local government increases, public enterprise debt increases accordingly. The findings confirm that public enterprises are used to lessen budget pressure by increasing the total public debt. This practice is like concealing local government debt by using off-budget entities, which eventually creates a fiscal illusion. Points for practitioners Off-budget entities are tools for bigger government and larger debt, so it is necessary to control the use of off-budget debt by imposing ceilings on the off-budget debt limit. From a comprehensive debt management perspective, off-budget entities should be used less to pursue government projects. Additionally, a segmented accounting system should be introduced within the off-budget entities.