The Effect of Individual and Pooled Profit Sharing Plans on Honesty in Managerial Reporting
实验研究发现，个人利润分享计划会降低管理层报告的诚实性，而集体利润分享计划能部分缓解这种负面效应，对设计利润分享方案有实践启示。
ABSTRACT Many organizations offer profit sharing plans to motivate increased effort and goal congruence. However, an unintended consequence of such plans may be to reduce honesty in managerial reporting. We investigate two commonly observed profit sharing plans (individual and pooled) in a laboratory experiment where multiple agents with private cost information submit budget requests to an employer. Consistent with our prediction based on crowding theory, our findings suggest that honesty is reduced in the presence of an individual profit sharing plan. However, when a pooled profit sharing plan is used, the adverse effects on honesty are partially mitigated. Our results suggest that an unintended consequence of profit sharing (decreased honesty) can be mitigated through interdependency from pooled plans. The results have practical implications, given that organizations have flexibility in establishing both the size and scope of their profit sharing plans. Our study also contributes to our understanding of reporting behavior, particularly in multi‐agent settings.