Hidden action and outcome contractibility: An experimental test of moral hazard theory
通过754人参与的实验室实验，检验了结果是否可写入合同对解决隐藏行动（道德风险）问题的影响，发现可契约化时激励相容合同有效，不可契约化时沟通能缓解努力不足。
In a laboratory experiment with 754 participants, we study the canonical one-shot moral hazard problem, comparing treatments with unobservable effort to benchmark treatments with verifiable effort. In our experiment, the players endogenously negotiate contracts. In line with contract theory, the contractibility of the outcome plays a crucial role when effort is a hidden action. If the outcome is contractible, most players overcome the hidden action problem by agreeing on incentive-compatible contracts. Communication is helpful, since it may reduce strategic uncertainty. If the outcome is non-contractible, in most cases low effort is chosen whenever effort is a hidden action. However, communication leads the players to agree on larger wages and substantially mitigates the underprovision of effort.