How Does Forced-CEO-Turnover Experience Affect Directors?
研究独立董事经历强制CEO更替后，更愿意解雇表现不佳的CEO、聘请外部CEO并改善董事会会议出席率，且股东对这类董事加入董事会反应积极。
Abstract We study changes in independent director behavior and labor-market outcomes after the experience of a forced Chief Executive Officer (CEO) turnover. We find that independent directors are more willing to fire CEOs of underperforming firms, hire outside CEOs after a firing, and encourage better board-meeting attendance by fellow directors. We also find that the shareholders of poorly performing firms react positively when experienced directors join the board. It does come with a small cost for directors, in terms of additional directorships, although the cost is not as great as that for directors who do not fire the CEO of a poorly performing firm.