Manager remuneration, share buybacks, and firm performance
通过动态异质性行业模型，研究了管理者薪酬方案如何影响企业投资决策、竞争力演变和股价，发现提高股权薪酬占比对管理者有利，但仅当全行业采用时才惠及股东，同时会减缓生产率增长并降低工人实际工资。
Using a dynamic heterogeneous agent industry model, we examine the impact of manager remuneration schemes on firms’ investment decisions and on the evolution of their competitiveness and share values. Whereas an increase in the share-based manager remuneration component is always beneficial to the manager, it is beneficial for shareholders only if such a change in the remuneration scheme is adopted by all firms in the industry. In that case, productivity growth is slowed down and workers’ real wages are reduced.