Payoff equivalence of efficient mechanisms in large matching markets
研究了当参与者数量很大且偏好随机时，所有帕累托有效的匹配机制（如顶交易循环、序列独裁等）产生的效用分布最终都趋近于功利主义上界，即机制间收益等价。
We study Pareto efficient mechanisms in matching markets when the number of agents is large and individual preferences are randomly drawn from a class of distributions, allowing for both common and idiosyncratic shocks. We provide a broad set of circumstances under which, as the market grows large, all Pareto efficient mechanisms - including top trading cycles (with an arbitrary ownership structure), serial dictatorship (with an arbitrary serial order), and their randomized variants - produce a distribution of agent utilities that in the limit coincides with the utilitarian upper bound. This implies that Pareto efficient mechanisms are uniformly asymptotically payoff equivalent "up to the renaming of agents." Hence, when the conditions of our model are met, policy makers need not discriminate among Pareto efficient mechanisms based on the aggregate payoff distribution of participants.