Delegation to a possibly ignorant agent
研究了委托人向有偏见且可能无知的代理人授权决策时，如何通过限制选择集来优化结果，发现委托人可能提供不连续的选择集，且代理人知情概率或偏见程度影响委托人收益。
Abstract In a delegation problem, an uninformed principal delegates decision‐making powers to a biased and possibly ignorant agent. The principal cannot use monetary payments but can restrict the set of the agent's choices. I show that in the general case, the principal may offer a disconnected set of choices. In a setting with arbitrary bias the uncertainty principle holds—the principal benefits as the likelihood that the agent is informed increases. When the bias is constant, I show that the ally principle holds—the principal benefits as the bias becomes smaller. Finally, when the likelihood of the agent being informed is determined by the agent's effort, then for small biases the principal benefits from limiting the agent's choice. When the agent is sufficiently biased, the principal gives more choice to the agent, so as to to improve incentives for information acquisition.