Management Risk Incentives and the Readability of Corporate Disclosures
研究发现，高管风险激励（期权vega值）越高，企业年报可读性越差，vega最高组比最低组年报篇幅多约15.4%，且这种效应受机构持股、管理层权力和分析师关注度影响。
Abstract Managers with higher risk incentives (greater options vega) issue less readable disclosures. Firms in the top quartile of vega file annual reports that are about 15.4% more voluminous than those in the bottom quartile. The effect of vega on obfuscation remains after controlling for firm risk, operating complexities, accounting and auditor choices, chief executive officer changes, and an exogenous shock to option compensation. This effect is tempered by higher institutional ownership, lower management entrenchment, and greater analyst following. Obfuscation benefits managers by increasing return volatility (option value) and allowing greater earnings management. These findings document a new link between options and disclosure transparency.