Whistling for Dismissal and Detriment Remedies: Royal Mail Ltd v Jhuti
分析了英国上诉法院在皇家邮政诉朱蒂案中关于吹哨人解雇与不利待遇救济的裁决，探讨了不同法律框架的边界问题，对劳动法学者和雇佣法律师有参考价值。
The recent decision of the Court of Appeal in Royal Mail Ltd v Jhuti1 raises several important and interlocking issues: ... It also highlights, but leaves unresolved, important questions about the scope of whistleblowing protection that arise from seeking to demarcate the boundaries of the differing regimes for detriment and dismissal protection. A whistleblower employee will often claim an unfair dismissal and detriment remedy together. Section 47B(1) Employment Rights Act 1996 (hereafter ERA 1996) provides that the worker must be subjected to a detrimental act or deliberate failure to act ‘on the ground that the worker has made a protected disclosure’.2 Dismissal on the grounds of having made a protected disclosure is defined in the normal way for automatically unfair dismissals under section 103A ERA 1996. In order to qualify, the tribunal must identify ‘the reason (or if more than one, the principal reason) for the dismissal…’ as being the fact that the ‘the employee made a protected disclosure’. In relation to employees only (but not other workers), the detriment provisions do not apply to any detriment that ‘amounts to dismissal’. Such claims can only be advanced within the unfair dismissal regime (section 47B(2) ERA 1996). There is no such demarcation issue for other workers, save that where the detriment is the termination of the worker’s contract, they cannot receive compensation which exceeds that which would be awarded if they had been an employee who had succeeded in a section 103A unfair dismissal claim (section 49(6) ERA 1996).3