Individual speculative behavior and overpricing in experimental asset markets
通过实验设计，先测量个体投机倾向，再组建市场交易，发现投机行为更强的交易者所在市场定价过高更显著，而在无法投机的市场中无此差异，证实投机是定价过高和泡沫形成的重要因素。
Abstract A rich history of theoretical models in finance shows that speculation can lead to overpricing and price bubbles. We provide evidence that, indeed, individual speculative behavior fuels overpricing in (experimental) asset markets. In a first step, we elicit individual speculative behavior in a one-shot setting with a novel speculation elicitation task (SET). In a second step, we use this measure of speculative behavior to compose dynamic, continuous double auction markets in line with Smith et al. (Econometrica 56(5):1119–1151, 1988). We find significant higher overpricing in markets with traders who exhibited more speculative behavior in the individual SET. However, we find no such differences in overpricing when we test for alternative explanations, using a market environment introduced by Lei, Noussair, and Plott (Econometrica 69(4):831–859, 2001) where speculation is impossible. Taken together, our results corroborate the notion that speculation is an important factor in overpricing and bubble formation if market environments allow for the pursuit of capital gains.