Dividend policy and bank opacity
研究了股利政策对银行不透明度的双重影响：支付股利降低不透明度，但过度支付则增加盈余管理，对银行监管有重要启示。
Abstract Does dividend policy increase or decrease bank opaqueness? Under the Dividend–Transparency Channel , paying dividends involves banks having greater discipline from the markets due to external financing and reduces private benefits of control, leading to lower earnings management concerns. Under the Dividend–Opacity Channel , due to a hesitancy to change dividend policy, banks have high vocations to engage earnings management to circumvent payout policy restrictions in debt covenants or to keep their dividend target unchanged. Employing a large sample of 2,483 U.S. bank holding companies from 2001:Q1–2013:Q4, the study documents the double‐edged sword of dividends on the discretionary behaviours of banks. Paying dividends makes banks less opaque to compare with nonpayers, which is consistent with the Dividend–Transparency Channel , however among dividend paying banks, excessive dividends involve banks to manage more their numbers, which is consistent with the Dividend–Opacity Channel . The findings are robust under different specifications. The results are of important interest to bank regulators.