Founders Matter! Serial Entrepreneurs and Venture Capital Syndicate Formation
研究了连续创业者和新手创业者对风险投资辛迪加形成的影响，发现信息不对称较低时，创业者更易组建对创业公司更有利的辛迪加，提供更多样化资源并减少控制权损失。
Although founders are responsible for soliciting venture capital (VC) funding, their influence over VC syndicate formation has largely been neglected in the extant literature. This article fills this gap by comparing serial and novice entrepreneurs. Using the information asymmetry argument as our guiding framework, we argue that when potential investors face diminished information asymmetry, entrepreneurs are more likely to form VC syndicates that are more beneficial to ventures—providing entrepreneurs with greater and more diverse resources and to some extent reducing entrepreneurs’ loss of control. Enriched by qualitative evidence from fieldwork, a quantitative analysis of 351 ventures shows general support for our argument and reveals unexpected nuances.