Organizational Form and Corporate Payout Policy
研究发现联合大企业比单一业务公司支付更多现金股利和总 payout，且 payout 对现金流更敏感，跨部门相关性越低则敏感性越高，并购后 payout 增加，表明联合大企业的内部保险机制使其能向股东支付更多现金流。
We examine how organizational form affects corporate payouts. Conglomerates pay out more than pure plays in both cash dividends and total payouts (cash dividends plus share repurchases). Furthermore, their payouts are more sensitive to cash flows compared to pure-play firms. The sensitivity of payouts to cash flow increases as the cross-segment correlation in a conglomerate decreases. Corporate payouts increase after mergers and acquisitions (M&As), especially among M&As in which acquirers and targets are less correlated. These results suggest that the coinsurance among different divisions of a conglomerate allows them to pay out more cash flow to their shareholders than pure-play firms.