Fiduciary Duty, Risk, and Shareholder Desert
本文论证现代金融理论应结合股东应得原则，修正管理层仅以股东财富最大化为目标的传统观点，为管理层在平衡股东与其他利益相关者诉求时提供指导。
ABSTRACT: A common moral argument is that shareholders have a special status because of risk when considering the duties of corporate management. The privileges of this status usually include the idea that management should adopt the goal of maximizing shareholder wealth. We argue that modern financial theory demonstrates that this argument should be modified by the recognition of a principle of desert, the shareholder desert principle (SDP). Financial theory can usefully circumscribe the duty owed to shareholders and the extent to which risk bearing justifies a claim on corporate value. When combined with the SDP, the result provides management with a guideline for what is owed to shareholders before other stakeholder non-contractual claims may be satisfied. As such, our approach provides management with some guidance through the thicket of competing stakeholder claims.