The Revolving Door of Sell-Side Analysts
研究了分析师被其覆盖的公司雇佣前一年内，是否通过发布有偏见的报告来讨好未来雇主，发现他们确实会高估雇佣公司的盈利预测、目标价和推荐，同时低估其他公司。
ABSTRACT Equity analysts are often hired by firms they cover. I document the extent to which this revolving door phenomenon impairs analysts' independence. I do this by examining the presence of biased research reports issued during the year before analysts are employed by a firm they cover. I find that during their final year, revolving door analysts bias their EPS forecasts, their target prices, and their recommendations in a direction that suggests that they are attempting to gain favor from their prospective employers. Specifically, relative to other analysts, revolving door analysts issue more optimistic reports on the firms that hire them, and they issue more pessimistic reports on firms that do not hire them. These results suggest the presence of strategic bias, although more innocuous interpretations cannot be completely ruled out. JEL Classifications: G14; G17; G24; G28; M41. Data Availability: Data are available from public sources identified in the text.