Why Do Retailers Advertise Store Brands Differently Across Product Categories?
研究了英国杂货市场中零售商对自有品牌的定价和广告策略，发现广告竞争越激烈，零售商越少为自有品牌做广告，且自有品牌的存在可能提高消费者总剩余。
We provide new evidence on retailers’ pricing and advertising of store brands in the U.K. grocery markets. We analyse a simple Hotelling model in which retailers and manufacturers endogenously advertise their respective brands; we account for the impact of advertising on retailer–manufacturer bargaining and downstream competition. The model predicts that retailers advertise their store brands less when advertising is more rivalrous. We present empirical evidence consistent with this prediction. According to our model, aggregate consumer surplus can be higher with store brands than when they are absent from the market.