The Limits to Partial Banking Unions: A Political Economy Approach
研究了部分银行业联盟中，跨国救助资金由超国家层面设定但由成员国分配时，自利政策制定者可能提取租金，导致受援国福利反而低于无联盟状态。
This paper studies the welfare effects of a “partial banking union” in which cross-country transfers for bailouts are set at the supranational level, but policymakers in member countries decide the distribution of funds. This allows the self-interested policymakers to extract rents in the bailout process. In equilibrium, such a banking union can actually lower the welfare of citizens in the country receiving transfers compared to the autarky case, as the receiving country must increase its share of the overall burden of the bailout, in order to compensate for the rent-seeking distortion. Supranational fiscal rules are ineffective at reversing this result.