The politics of state compliance with international “soft law” in finance
研究了国家为何遵守或不遵守国际金融软法，通过分析国际标准制定与国内合规之间的脱节，识别出上传和下载两个阶段的因果机制，并以美国和欧盟对巴塞尔协议的合规记录为例说明。
Why do jurisdictions comply (or not) with international soft law in finance? This research systematically links international and domestic explanations of compliance by highlighting the “disjuncture” between the international standard‐setting process and the process of domestic compliance. Two causal mechanisms that affect compliance are identified. In the uploading stage, elected officials delegate the making of international soft law to domestic regulators; large, internationally active financial institutions mobilize extensively and, to a large extent, successfully. In the downloading stage, domestic interest groups team up with elected officials in order to resist compliance with international soft law that has negative distributional implications for domestic constituencies. These arguments are illustrated through a structured, focused comparison, and process tracing of the mixed record of compliance of the two main jurisdictions worldwide—the United States and the European Union—with the main international banking standards, the Basel Accords.