Preferences for biodiversity offset contracts on arable land: a choice experiment study with farmers
通过法国北部农民的选择实验，发现农民明显不愿签署生物多样性补偿合同，仅接受用于临时影响或已退化区域的合同，而条件性奖金可提高合同参与面积但增加开发商成本。
Biodiversity offsetting (BO) is aimed at achieving no net loss of biodiversity in the context of economic development. Through a choice experiment in Northern France, we show that farmers have a clear preference for not signing up BO contracts. The contracts they accept may only be suitable for offsetting temporary impacts on already degraded areas of natural habitat but not for permanent impacts on high-quality habitat. We find that the introduction of a conditional monetary bonus can improve the organisational and ecological efficiency of BO because it increases the enrolled acreage in a BO contract per farmer albeit at an increased cost for developers.