Indefinitely repeated contests: An experimental study
通过实验研究无限重复竞赛中的合作行为，发现更长的预期时间跨度会降低支出（即增加合作），但这一效果随竞赛经验减弱；无限重复比有限重复更合作；赢家通吃与比例奖励两种竞赛形式的合作程度无理论差异，但实验发现后者合作更少。
Abstract We experimentally explore indefinitely repeated contests. Theory predicts more cooperation, in the form of lower expenditures, in indefinitely repeated contests with a longer expected time horizon. Our data support this prediction, although this result attenuates with contest experience. Theory also predicts more cooperation in indefinitely repeated contests compared to finitely repeated contests of the same expected length, and we find empirical support for this. Finally, theory predicts no difference in cooperation across indefinitely repeated winner-take-all and proportional-prize contests, yet we find evidence of less cooperation in the latter, though only in longer treatments with more contests played. Our paper extends the experimental literature on indefinitely repeated games to contests and, more generally, contributes to an infant empirical literature on behavior in indefinitely repeated games with “large” strategy spaces.