Delegation of Decision Rights and Misreporting: The Roles of Incentive-based Compensation Schemes and Responsibility Rationalization
研究决策权委托和激励薪酬如何影响经理人的误报行为，发现经理人的责任合理化会调节这两种组织设计对误报的作用。
Our paper examines when and how the delegation of decision rights and incentive-based compensation schemes (two organizational-design choices) and responsibility rationalization affect managers’ misreporting behavior. One hundred and twenty-nine managers from manufacturing firms in the US completed an online survey. Our results suggest that managers’ responsibility rationalization moderates the relationships between the delegation of decision rights and misreporting, and incentive-based compensation schemes and misreporting. Despite our results providing no evidence of a simple mediating role of incentive-based compensation schemes on the relationship between the delegation of decision rights and misreporting, we find support for a moderated-mediation effect. Specifically, our results demonstrate that the indirect effect of the delegation of decision rights on misreporting via incentive-based compensation schemes is conditional on managers’ responsibility rationalization. The theoretical and practical implications of our findings are discussed.