A Model of Educational Investment, Social Concerns, and Inequality
研究教育投资如何通过生产力、信号和社会地位影响不平等，发现社会关切对不平等的影响取决于教育对低技能工人耻辱感与高技能工人声望的差异化作用。
Abstract We consider a model in which educational investments entail productivity gains, signaling power, and social status. The latter depends on the agent's relative achievement in one of three dimensions: innate skills, level of schooling, and income. We study the three scenarios separately and characterize the conditions under which social concerns increase or decrease educational and income inequality. Inequality increases (decreases) if education lowers the stigma suffered by low‐skilled workers less (more) than it boosts the prestige enjoyed by high‐skilled workers. We discuss the expected results of some policies in light of these findings.