Learning while setting precedents
研究了决策者在有约束力和无约束力先例下，通过调查获取信息、设定先例并影响社会福利的动态过程，发现约束性先例早期激励更强但后期减弱，可能提高福利。
Abstract A decision maker makes a ruling on a random case in each period. She is uncertain about the correct ruling until conducting a costly investigation. A ruling establishes a precedent, which cannot be violated under binding precedent. We compare the information acquisition incentives, the evolution of standards and the social welfare under nonbinding and binding precedents. Compared to nonbinding precedent, under binding precedent, information acquisition incentives are stronger in earlier periods, but become weaker as more precedents are established. Although erroneous rulings may be perpetuated under binding precedent, welfare can be higher because of the more intensive investigation early on.