ENTRY REGULATIONS, WELFARE, AND DETERMINANTS OF MARKET STRUCTURE
利用瑞典零售食品店的独特数据，通过动态寡头模型评估准入规制对长期盈利、市场结构和福利的影响，发现降低进入成本增强竞争可提高福利，而保护小店的许可费政策则无益。
Abstract Welfare effects of entry regulations are theoretically ambiguous in differentiated product markets. We use a dynamic oligopoly model of entry and exit with store‐type differentiation and static price setting to evaluate how entry regulations affect long‐run profitability, market structure, and welfare. Based on unique data for all retail food stores in Sweden, we estimate demand, recover variable profits, and estimate entry costs and fixed costs by store type. Counterfactual policy experiments show that welfare increases when competition is enhanced by lower entry costs. Protecting small stores by imposing licensing fees on large stores is not welfare enhancing.