Persuasion Meets Delegation
研究了委托人限制代理人信息（说服问题）或自由裁量权（委托问题）的等价性，在单调随机机制下两者等价，并利用说服工具刻画最优委托机制。
A principal can restrict an agent's information (the persuasion problem) or discretion (the delegation problem). We study these two problems under standard single‐crossing assumptions on the agent's marginal utility. We show that these problems are equivalent on the set of monotone stochastic mechanisms, implying, in particular, the equivalence of deterministic delegation and monotone partitional persuasion. We also show that the monotonicity restriction is superfluous for linear persuasion and linear delegation, implying their equivalence on the set of all stochastic mechanisms. Finally, using tools from the persuasion literature, we characterize optimal delegation mechanisms, thereby generalizing and extending existing results in the delegation literature.