Market Discipline and Systemic Risk
构建一般均衡模型，分析银行如何通过选择相关投资来内生生成系统性风险，并探讨技术变革、政府贷款及资本要求对风险的影响。
We analyze a general equilibrium model in which financial institutions generate endogenous systemic risk. Banks optimally select correlated investments and thereby expose themselves to fire-sale risk so as to sharpen their incentives. Systemic risk is therefore a natural consequence of banks’ fundamental role as delegated monitors. Our model sheds light on recent and historical trends in measured systemic risk. Technological innovations and government-directed lending can cause surges in systemic risk. Strict capital requirements and well-designed government-asset purchase programs can combat systemic risk. This paper was accepted by Gustavo Manso, finance.