POLITICAL BUDGET CYCLES: MANIPULATION BY LEADERS VERSUS MANIPULATION BY RESEARCHERS? EVIDENCE FROM A META‐REGRESSION ANALYSIS
对46项研究中的1037个回归结果进行元分析，发现几乎没有系统证据表明国家领导人操纵财政工具以连任，但研究者选择性报告此类操纵的现象更明显，且过去25年出版偏倚有所减少。
Abstract Despite a long history of research on political budget cycles, their existence and magnitude are still in question. By conducting a systematic analysis of the existing literature, we intend to clarify the debate. Based on data collected from 1037 regressions in 46 studies, our meta‐analysis suggests that little, if any, systematic evidence can be found in the research record that national leaders do manipulate fiscal tools in order to be reelected. However, it is much more clear that researchers selectively report that national leaders do manipulate fiscal tools in order to be reelected. The publication selection bias highlighted has nonetheless been reduced during the past 25 years of research. We also show that the incumbents' strategies differ depending on which tools they use. Finally, the nature and quality of political institutions appear to be the factors which most affect the political budget cycles.