TRADE DISPUTES AND SETTLEMENT
构建了一个包含重新谈判和不完全可验证信息的贸易协定模型，分析贸易争端如何产生及以不同方式解决，并用GATT/WTO实际争端数据验证了模型的关键预测。
Abstract We develop a model of trade agreements with renegotiation and imperfectly verifiable information. In equilibrium, trade disputes can occur and can be resolved in a variety of ways: Governments may settle “early” or trigger a court ruling, and in the latter case, they may implement the ruling or reach a post‐ruling settlement. The model yields predictions on how the dispute outcome depends on the contracting environment and how it correlates with the optimal contract form. We find support for a key prediction of our model using data on the outcomes of actual trade disputes in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade/World Trade Organization.