Myopia and Anchoring
证明了不完全信息的均衡效应与两种行为扭曲（对未来过度贴现的近视、以及将当前行为锚定于过去的习惯）在数学上等价，并展示了如何用预期数据来约束这些扭曲，最后以通胀为例进行量化应用。
We develop an equivalence between the equilibrium effects of incomplete information and those of two behavioral distortions: myopia, or extra discounting of the future; and anchoring of current behavior to past behavior, as in models with habit persistence or adjustment costs. We show how these distortions depend on higher-order beliefs and GE mechanisms, and how they can be disciplined by evidence on expectations. We finally illustrate the use of our toolbox with a quantitative application in the context of inflation, a bridge to the HANK literature, and an extension to networks.