Market Structure and Borrower Welfare in Microfinance
研究不同市场结构（非营利、营利垄断、竞争市场）下小额信贷借款人的福利，发现市场力量会严重损害福利，而竞争通常能带来与非营利贷款相近的福利。
Motivated by recent controversies surrounding the role of commercial lenders \nin microfinance, we analyze borrower welfare under different market structures, \nconsidering a benevolent non-profit lender, a for-profit monopolist, and \na competitive credit market. To understand the magnitude of the effects analyzed, \nwe simulate the model with parameters estimated from the MIX Market \ndatabase. Our results suggest that market power can have severe implications \nfor borrower welfare, while despite possible information frictions competition \ntypically delivers similar borrower welfare to non-profit lending. In addition, \nfor-profit lenders are less likely to use joint liability than non-profits. \n