CMBS and Conflicts of Interest: Evidence from Ownership Changes for Servicers
研究商业抵押贷款支持证券中服务商所有权变更后，其处置不良资产时可能向新所有者关联方输送利益，导致损失率上升8个百分点（约23亿美元），揭示了潜在的利益冲突。
ABSTRACT Self‐dealing is potentially important but difficult to measure. In this paper, I study special servicers in commercial mortgage‐backed securities (CMBS), which sell distressed assets on behalf of bondholders. Around 2010, ownership changes of four major servicers raised concerns that they may direct benefits to new owners' affiliates (buyers and service providers). Loans liquidated after ownership changes have greater loss rates than before (8 percentage points (p.p.), $2.3 billion in losses), relative to other (placebo) servicers. Together with a case study that tracks self‐dealing purchases, the findings point to potential steering conflicts that could incentivize tunneling through fees to service providers.