BANKRUPTCY AND DELINQUENCY IN A MODEL OF UNSECURED DEBT
记录了个人消费债务拖欠的动态事实，并构建定量模型解释为何拖欠者常获得债务减免而非惩罚性利率，对理解债务违约机制和信贷政策有参考价值。
Abstract This article documents and interprets a fact central to the dynamics of informal consumer debt default. We observe that for individuals 60– 90 days late on payments, (i) 85% make payments during the next quarter, and (ii) 40% reduce their debt. To understand these facts, we develop a quantitative model of debt delinquency and bankruptcy. Our model reproduces the dynamics of delinquency and suggests an interpretation of the data in which lenders frequently reset loan terms for delinquent borrowers, typically offering partial debt forgiveness, instead of a blanket imposition of the “penalty rates” most unsecured credit contracts specify.