Feed-in tariffs with minimum price guarantees and regulatory uncertainty
研究了带有最低价格保证的上网电价补贴合同如何影响投资者决策，发现永久保证仅在价格低于下限时诱导投资，而有限保证即使收益低于成本也能诱导投资，监管不确定性会促使提前投资，市场波动则导致推迟投资。
The feed-in tariff (FIT) program is a popular policy for incentivizing new renewable energy projects because it establishes a long-term contract with renewable energy investors. This paper presents a novel model to analyze a FIT contract with a minimum price guarantee (i.e., a price-floor regime) from an investor's perspective. The results show that a perpetual guarantee only induces investment for prices below the price floor when offering a risk-free investment opportunity. In contrast, the finite guarantee may induce investment even when the revenue from the guarantee is lower than the investment cost. When an investor faces a scenario with regulatory uncertainty, a higher and more likely reduction in the price floor induces earlier investment. For all cases, investors postpone an investment decision when market conditions present a higher price volatility. (C) 2018 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.