Accounting‐Based Compensation and Debt Contracts*
研究发现，CEO获得长期会计薪酬计划后，企业新银行贷款的利差更低、限制性条款更少，信用评级提升，信用违约互换利差下降，表明这类薪酬有助于降低企业信用风险。
ABSTRACT We examine how accounting‐based compensation plans influence a firm's contracts with its creditors. After granting long‐term accounting‐based compensation plans (LTAPs) to CEOs, firms pay lower spreads and have fewer restrictive covenants in new bank loans. Mechanisms leading to lower borrowing cost include improvements in debt repayment ability, reduced shareholder‐debtholder conflicts, and reduced risk‐taking incentives. Creditors view LTAPs as a substitute for monitoring, adjust covenant design based on LTAP features, and value plans with concave performance‐payout functions and reasonable performance targets. A firm's credit rating improves and CDS spread declines after LTAP grants, suggesting that LTAPs help reduce firms' credit risk.