Targeted wage subsidies and firm performance
利用瑞典1998-2008年行政数据，研究发现通过定向工资补贴招聘的企业在多项指标上显著优于其他招聘企业，但2007年改革取消个案工作者审批后效果减弱。
This paper studies how targeted wage subsidies affect the performance of the recruiting firms. Using Swedish administrative data from the period 1998–2008, we show that treated firms substantially outperform other recruiting firms after hiring through subsidies, despite identical pre-treatment performance levels and trends in a wide set of key dimensions. The pattern is less clear from 2007 onwards, after a reform removed the involvement of caseworkers from the subsidy approval process. Overall, our results suggest that targeted employment subsidies can have large positive effects on post-match outcomes of the hiring firms, at least if the policy environment allows for pre-screening by caseworkers.