Implementation by Vote-Buying Mechanisms
研究了允许代理人以递增成本表达支持程度的投票买卖机制，证明在财富不平等的大社会中，良好行为的投票买卖机制所实施的社会选择规则由单一参数决定，该参数取决于成本函数在原点附近的弹性。
Vote-buying mechanisms allow agents to express any level of support for their preferred alternative at an increasing cost. Focusing on large societies with wealth inequality, we prove that the family of binary social choice rules implemented by well-behaved vote-buying mechanisms is indexed by a single parameter, which determines the importance assigned to the agents’ willingness to pay to affect outcomes and to the number of supporters for each alternative. This parameter depends solely on the elasticity of the cost function near its origin: as this elasticity decreases, the intensities of support matter relatively more for outcomes than the supporters’ count.