迭代弱占优与区间占优超模博弈

Iterated weak dominance and interval-dominance supermodular games

Theoretical Economics · 2019
被引 10
人大 AABS 4

中文导读

扩展了Milgrom和Roberts对超模博弈的研究,在更弱假设下给出迭代删除弱占优策略后存活策略集的边界,并分析删除顺序无关的条件,对均衡选择和动态稳定性有启示。

Abstract

This paper extends Milgrom and Robert's treatment of supermodular games in two ways. It points out that their main characterization result holds under a weaker assumption. It refines the arguments to provide bounds on the set of strategies that survive iterated deletion of weakly dominated strategies. I derive the bounds by iterating the best-response correspondence. I give conditions under which they are independent of the order of deletion of dominated strategies. The results have implications for equilibrium selection and dynamic stability in games.

迭代弱占优区间占优超模博弈超模博弈弱占优策略迭代剔除