The Role of Affect in Shaping the Behavioral Consequences of CEO Option Incentives
结合心理学和行为决策理论，研究情感（情绪）如何影响CEO在股票期权激励下的风险行为，发现积极情绪会放大风险承担或风险规避的倾向，而CEO问责制会削弱这种影响。
We advance behavioral agency theory by exploring the influence of mood or “affect” on the behavioral consequences of stock option incentives. Drawing on insights from psychology and behavioral decision theory, we describe how affect influences agent risk behavior. We argue that positive affect amplifies both the extent to which executives reduce strategic risk taking in response to risk bearing and engage in strategic risk taking in response to incentives for further enrichment. Building again on the psychology literature, we describe how CEO accountability attenuates the influence of affect on CEO risk behavior in response to stock option incentives. We test our expectations in a longitudinal data set of CEO stock option incentives, affect, and strategic risk taking by U.S. firms.