Banking privatization and market structure in Brazil: a dynamic structural analysis
研究巴西银行私有化对偏远小市场银行网点数量的影响，发现私有化会大幅减少银行数量，而补贴运营成本比补贴进入成本更有效。
Abstract This article examines the effects of bank privatization on the number of bank branches operating in small isolated markets in Brazil. We estimate a dynamic game played between Brazilian public and private banks. We find private banks compete with each other as expected. We also find public banks generate positive spillovers for private banks. Our counterfactual study shows that privatization substantially reduces the number of banks. The government can mitigate the effects of privatization by providing subsidies to private banks. Our model predicts subsidy policies that reduce operating costs are more cost‐effective than entry costs for isolated markets in Brazil.