Accountability with Large Electorates
研究发现，即使选民信息不足，也能通过抽样效应实现高水平的选举问责，其效果堪比面对全知的社会规划者；但公共信息或意识形态偏好会削弱这一效应，而选民的过度自信则能恢复其全部好处。
We show that ignorant voters can succeed in establishing high levels of electoral accountability. In our model, an incumbent politician is confronted with a large number of voters who receive fuzzy private signals about her performance. A sampling effect enables the incumbent to form a precise estimate of the median voter's signal, and the resulting level of accountability is as if the incumbent faced a perfectly informed social planner. Public information or ideological preferences can impair the beneficial impact of the sampling effect on accountability; overconfidence of voters can restore the full benefit of the sampling effect.