Dynamic runs and circuit breakers: an experiment
通过实验室实验，研究了熔断机制在市场挤兑中的作用，发现信息质量差时熔断可能产生反效果，而信息质量高时则能改善福利。
Abstract Although now widespread in financial markets, circuit breakers remain controversial among researchers and professional investors. We formalize the popular argument that circuit breakers provide a “cooling-off” period for investors during market runs and we test it in the laboratory. Our experiment reproduces a market where investors fear future liquidity shocks but receive news about the true state over time. Notably, we find that when information quality is poor circuit breakers can have perverse effects on trading behavior. However, when information quality is high, circuit breakers can improve welfare by providing agents with time to learn about the true state, when private incentives to wait for more information are insufficient.