Peremptory Challenges and Jury Selection
研究了美国司法中律师用来否决候选陪审员的无因回避权如何影响陪审团构成，发现它反而增加了极端意识形态陪审团的概率，且无法设计出明确减少这种可能性的程序。
I examine how peremptory challenges, which are vetoes that attorneys may use to reject prospective jurors, affect jury composition. The purpose of peremptory challenges is to eliminate biased jurors; however, I show that under the two most common rules used in the United States, peremptory challenges actually increase the probability of juries composed entirely of members on one extreme or another of some ideological spectrum. I then show that it is not possible to design a peremptory-challenge procedure that unambiguously makes such juries less likely. I show that if unanimity is required for conviction, the distribution of juror types is symmetric about some mean type, and each attorney has the same number of challenges, then challenges benefit the prosecution.