Cream Skimming and Information Design in Matching Markets
研究了平台如何设计买家信息以影响卖家决策，发现完全信息导致卖家过度拒绝而市场失灵，同质卖家时粗信息可恢复效率，异质卖家时简单审查政策常能达到约束有效。
Short-lived buyers arrive to a platform over time and randomly match with sellers. The sellers stay at the platform and decide whether to accept incoming requests. The platform designs what buyer information the sellers observe before deciding to form a match. We show full information disclosure leads to a market failure because of excessive rejections by the sellers. If sellers are homogeneous, then coarse information policies are able to restore efficiency. If sellers are heterogeneous, then simple censorship policies are often constrained efficient as shown by a method of calculus of variations.