Too Busy or Well-Connected? Evidence from a Shock to Multiple Directorships
研究发现，因并购导致董事多重任职减少的公司，平均运营绩效、监督和战略建议有所改善；但董事会人脉减少最多的公司，运营绩效和建议效果为负或无效，揭示了多重董事职位的成本与收益。
ABSTRACT Prior literature documents that multiple directorships are negatively associated with operating performance due to overly busy directors; however, multiple directorships may also increase firm value because directors gain access to valuable connections, resources, and information through their multiple appointments. This paper examines M&A that terminate target firms' entire boards as a negative shock to both board busyness and connections at other firms, as a complement to Hauser (2018). We document that firms experiencing a decrease in multiple directorships due to M&A exhibit improved operating performance, monitoring, and strategic advising, on average. Firms with the smallest decrease in board connections experience the greatest improvement in operating performance and advising, while firms with the greatest decrease in board connections experience null or negative effects on operating performance and advising. Our findings provide new evidence of the costs and benefits of multiple directorships based on board busyness and connections.