WORKER TURNOVER AND UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE
研究了一个包含学习匹配生产率的竞争性搜索模型，分析了风险规避工人如何考虑当前和未来的失业风险，以及公共保险如何影响工人流动和工作构成。
Abstract This article studies a competitive search model of the labor market with learning about match‐specific productivity in which risk‐averse workers factor present and future unemployment risks in their search decisions. We examine internally efficient equilibrium allocations in which match termination occurs only if the joint value of a worker–firm pair is negative. Internal efficiency poses a trade‐off between present and future risks. Public insurance provision also affects this trade‐off and, hence, worker turnover and job composition. In addition to unemployment benefits, the implementation of the planner's allocation requires a negative income tax and a 0 layoff tax.