How Firm Reputation Shapes Managerial Discretion
提出理论框架，解释企业声誉如何影响管理者在日常决策中感知到的自由裁量权，区分了基于行为和基于结果的声誉，以及行动和目标的自由裁量权，对声誉与决策交叉研究有贡献。
Reputation is not always a “good thing.” Despite the established benefits of a good reputation, recent research has elucidated the burdens and liabilities it can bring about, particularly following a crisis or stakeholder disappointment. However, managers spend much of their time avoiding such extreme events rather than responding to them, and we know very little about how reputation influences managers’ everyday decisions. We address this issue by offering a theoretical framework to explain how reputation shapes managers’ perceptions of their discretion as they attempt to navigate stakeholder expectations. In doing so we clarify and elaborate two forms of reputation—those rooted in a firm’s behaviors and those rooted in a firm’s outcomes—as well as two forms of discretion—managers’ perceived latitude of actions and their perceived latitude of objectives—thereby synthesizing and extending recent work in both the reputation literature and discretion literature. The intersection of social evaluations and managerial decisions remains an exciting and fruitful avenue of research, and we aim to illustrate how the insights from the meticulous efforts of scholars in both fields would benefit from further cross-pollination.