Enfranchising Your Own? Experimental Evidence on Bureaucrat Diversity and Election Bias in India
利用印度选举中官员随机分配的自然实验，发现投票站管理团队的宗教和种姓构成变化会影响投票结果，且官员自由裁量权越大时影响越强，机制可能是偏袒同群体。
This paper investigates the effects of polling station administrator diversity on elections in India, using a natural experiment: the random assignment of government officials to teams managing stations on election day, together with surveys conducted with voters and election officers. I demonstrate that changes in the religious and caste composition of officer teams impact voting at the polling station level, causing shifts in coalition vote shares large enough to influence election outcomes. Effects are strongest when officers have greater discretion over the voting process. I also provide evidence suggesting own-group favoritism by election personnel as one relevant mechanism.